1976: The Theft That Never Was: Inside Venezuela’s 1976
Oil Takeover
Recently, Stephen Miller, a key advisor to U.S. President Trump,
said that US companies developed the Venezuelan oil industry only to see it
stolen and weaponized against them.
A response to Miller’s statement was made by Marcus Golding, who earned his Ph.D. in
History from the University of Texas at Austin in 2025, with a dissertation
titled The Price of Doing Business: Foreign Oil Companies and the Venezuelan
Petroleum Industry (1936–1976).
His essay can be read here: https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2025/12/26/the-theft-that-never-was-inside-venezuelas-1976-oil-takeover/
Here are some excerpts from his Essay:
“Venezuela’s 1976 oil nationalization was engineered to
preclude confrontation. Getting the history right matters. If the current U.S.
administration wants to cite this episode to justify pressure, escalation, or
exceptional measures, it has chosen a poor example, precisely because the
process avoided the kind of rupture Mr. Miller invokes. “
“The nationalization of the Venezuelan petroleum industry
responded to global events unfolding in the Middle East around 1970. What
followed in 1971 sent shock waves across the world: Libya nationalized its oil
industry, followed by Algeria and Iraq. This process quickly expanded to the
rest of the Middle East. “
“This global context greeted President Rafael Caldera
(1969-1974). Soon, every political faction in Congress sought to outdo the
other in displaying their anti-corporate credentials. Caldera stood at the top
as the most nationalist of the pack, passing an unprecedented package of bills
and decrees destined to expand government control over the industry
significantly. By the time he handed power to Carlos Andrés Pérez, de facto
state control over the entire industry was already in place. Nationalization
became the only politically safe position when the electoral campaign of 1973
started. Once elected, Pérez authorized the creation of a Presidential
Commission in charge of studying the state takeover and proposing a bill to
that effect.”
“Led by Venezuelan mid-level managers, the managerial class
came together to form Agrupación de Orientación Petrolera (AGROPET). AGROPET ran a public campaign for an orderly,
compensatory nationalization. The organization’s pivotal moment came in January
1975, when its leaders met with President Pérez and laid out what became the
blueprint for the 1976 nationalization. Their model envisioned a holding
company with four affiliates that would absorb concessionaire operations. The
new organizational culture would blend practices inherited from the Creole
Petroleum Corporation and Shell, and the nationalized industry would retain
ties to its foreign predecessors. Under this proposal, Petróleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA) became, in effect, the direct descendant of the multinationals that
built Venezuela’s modern oil industry. It perpetuated the business philosophy
of the multinationals. Pérez sided with
the technocrats and sent an amended bill to Congress, crucially allowing
foreign capital to return. The legislature enacted the bill in August 1975. Two
months later, Creole and the other firms accepted a compensation package of
about $1 billion for their expropriated assets. PDVSA quickly signed service
and technology agreements with the very companies it had expropriated. “
“For much of the political opposition, the outcome felt
bittersweet. Many wanted the kind of dramatic showdown associated with Cárdenas
in Mexico, Mossadegh in Iran, or Velasco Alvarado in Peru, cases where claims
of expropriation and “theft” of U.S. property could at least be mounted.
Venezuela in 1976 stood far away from that drama, and once the transfer was
complete, business continued as usual. “
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